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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
VETERAN'S PENSION FUND -

REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE FOR CARE OF INCOM-

Congressional power to enact legislation providing for benefits
to military veterans is said to be implied from its express powers to declare and conduct
war.' Theoretically, such benefits are bounties awarded for prior faithful services in
war, and as an incentive for inducing men to fight in future wars. 2 It follows that
Congress has the right to condition payment on factors it deems necessary for the
fulfillment of the legislative purpose.3 Basically this is what Congress has done in
38 U.S.C.A. § 3101, 4 providing in part that benefits paid under any law administered by the Veterans Administration 5 are exempt from claims of creditors and
are not liable to attachment, levy, or seizure.6
Although section 3101 is only a little over a year old, such exemptions have
been the law for nearly a century by virtue of a provision of the Civil War Pension
Act' and former sections 4548 and 454(a) 9 of Title 38. For this reason, numerous
decisions can be found construing measures similar or identical to section 3101.
No attempt will be made to analyze the many issues in this mass of cases. Instead,
attention will be focused on the current and most frequently litigated problems.
One such issue confronted the Supreme Court of Illinois recently in Department of Public Welfare v. Sevcik. 10 There, the Illinois Department of Public
Welfare sought payment from the conservator of an incompetent veteran for
charges accruing from the care and maintenance of the veteran in a state mental
institution. The conservator opposed the department's petition on the ground that
the only assets of the conservatorship were funds acquired from the proceeds of the
veteran's pension checks; and that these funds were exempted from the claims of
creditors by authority of section 3101. The Welfare Department countered this
contention with the argument that charges for medical care and subsistence were
not meant to be exempted by section 3101. The department maintained that since
the state's claim grew out of furnishing the incompetent with the necessities of life,
it should be subject to a different classification from the claims of a general creditor.
Accepting this argument, the court reversed the decision below with the apparently
clairvoyant observation that Congress did not intend to render veteran's benefits
exempt from the claim of a state for the support and maintenance of veterans.
A number of state court decisions have dealt with the application of the
exemption clause to the claim of a state seeking reimbursement for the care and
maintenance of an incompetent V.A. beneficiary in a state institution. The weight
of authority is that the state is entitled to reimbursement from exempted funds.:1
The gist of these holdings appear to be that the state is not a creditor within the
meaning of the exemption statute.' 2 The rationale sustaining this conclusion is that
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U.S. v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932).
In re Ballard's Estate, 161 Misc. 785, 293 N.Y. Supp. 31 (1937).
72 Stat. 1229 (1958).

6

More fully this provision reads:
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered
by the Veteran's Administration . . . shall be exempt from the claim of
creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under

5

Hereafter referred to as V.A.

any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the

beneficiary....
7 Rzv. STAT. § 4747 (1875).
8 43 Stat. 613 (1924).
9 49 Stat. 609 (1935).
10 164 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. 1960).
11 E.g., Matter of Simpson, 270 App. Div. 902, 61 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1946).
12 E.g., Auditor General v. Olezniczak, 302 Mich. 336, 4 N.W.2d 679 (1942).
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the purpose behind the granting of pensions and similar veteran's benefits is to
provide for the care and support of the beneficiary,'3 therefore the state is seeking
in effect to carry out the purpose of the grant.' 4
However, some courts, while permitting payment, disallow any portion of
the state's claim accruing prior to the appointment of a guardian.' 5 It is said that
this seemingly arbitrary distinction is supported by the "fundamental policy of protecting the incompetent against depletion of his estate by6 claims accruing before
the estate is protected by the watchful eye of a guardian."'
The Rothenberg Estate case,'7 a recent Pennsylvania trial court decision,
deserves some mention. The case itself was a restitution action by the state
to recover the cost of providing care and maintenance for an incompetent veteran
in a state mental institution. The court held that, within the purview of the exemption statute, the state was a creditor for that part of its claim which accrued
prior to the appointment of a guardian. While the holding was in line with some
of the above mentioned decisions, the case is especially significant because the V.A.
intervened in the action and gave its endorsement to the court's decision.
District of Columbia v. Reilly' is the only case on point to reach a federal
court of appeals. The V.A. and a national veteran's organization considered the
case important enough to file briefs as amici curiae; but the court disposed of it
with a cryptic per curiam opinion. It affirmed a lower court's ruling that the District of Columbia was a creditor under the terms of the exemption statute insofar
as its claim represented payment for the care and maintenance of an incompetent
veteran prior to the time a guardian was appointed for the incompetent. Although
professing not to pass on the question, the court also indicated that the District
could not recover for payments made by it subsequent to the appointment of a
guardian:
With respect to payments made by the District after the committee was
appointed, the trial court granted the District's claim. The District's brief
concedes that "Manifestly if, under the section quoted above, the funds in
the patient's estate are exempt from the claim of the District of Columbia
for reimbursement for money expended prior to the appointment of a committee, such funds are exempt from any such claims of the District of Columbia for moneys expended subsequent to the appointment of a committee."
is not before us
This concession is probably correct. However, the question
for decision, because the committee failed to appeal.' 9
Another recurring problem is whether the veteran's benefits can be reached by

a divorced wife seeking alimony payments. The majority view is that they can.20
According to this view, a wife is not a creditor within the meaning of the exemption
statute.2 . In other words, alimony is not a debt, "but represents the judgment of
the court as to the manner in which the husband shall be required to perform
his marital
and public duty,"2" Congress did not intend to relieve the veteran of
23
this duty.
Whether property acquired out of exempt funds is liable to attachment or levy
by creditors presents a third troublesome question. For example, a veteran buys

13 E.g., In re Todd's Estate, 243 Iowa 930, 54 N.W.2d 679 (1942).
14 E.g., In re Lewis' Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938).
15 E.g., In re Bemowski's Guardianship, 3 Wis.2d 133, 88 N.W.2d 22 (1958); In re
Ferarazza's Estate, 219 Cal. 668, 28 P.2d 670 (1934); In re Murphy's Committee, 227 App.
Div. 839, 237 N.Y. Supp. 448 (1929).
16 In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 212 P.2d 587, 591 (1949).
17 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 383 (C.P. 1958).
18 249 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
19 Id. at 525.
20 E.g., Hannah v. Hannah, 191 Ga. 134, 11 S.E.2d 779 (1940). But cf. Brewer v.
Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 84 S.W.2d 1022 (1933). See also Riker v. Riker, 160 Misc. 117,
289 N.Y. Supp. 835 (1936).
21 E.g., Stone v. Stone, 188 Ark. 622, 67 S.W.2d 189 (1934).
22 In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1940).
23 Hollis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 687 (1932).
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an automobile out of funds obtained solely from a V.A. pension.2 4 Can a creditor
reach the automobile? Although there was some uncertainty in early cases,25 the
matter has been clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In Carrier v.
Bryant,26 the Court held that the exemption does not apply to property purchased
out of moneys received as a V.A. benefit, and that such property is subject to execution upon a judgment against the beneficiary. However, another Supreme Court
decision makes it equally clear that the exemption is not waived by the veteran
when he deposits the benefit payments in a bank. 2 The exemption remains in
effect until the money is either invested or spent.
Conclusion
As the two world wars and the Korean conflict fade further into the past,
more and more persons become eligible for V.A. pensions and kindred benefits.
It follows that an increasing number of courts will be called upon to construe
section 3101 under varying factual situations. Because of the tendency of some
state courts to put local interests above congressional policy, there is a danger that
the act will become honeycombed with judicially created exceptions. Congress
has ignored this problem by re-enacting the measure without change in the face
of conflicting and inconsistent state court interpretations. If the situation gets too
far out of hand, the Supreme Court of the United States can attempt to establish
uniformity through its power of review, but at best this is only a partial solution.
If full scope is to be given the legislative policy, Congress must further clarify its
position.
Thomas Kavadas,
Jr.

24 Liles v. H. K. Mulford Co., 52 Ga. App. 674, 184 S.E. 396 (1936).
25 See Annot., 109 A.L.R. 433 (1937); KiMBROUGH AND GLEN,
VETERANS § 46 (2d ed. 1954).
26 306 U.S. 545 (1939); see also 38 C.F.R. § 14.339 (1957).
27 Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937).
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